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Abstract 
 
We estimate a collective time allocation model, where Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean and 
Turkish households behave as if both spouses maximize a household utility function. We 
assume that paid labor and housework are the endogenous choice variables and furthermore 
consider household production. Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish women differ from Dutch 
women because they value (joint) household production more in their utility function. 
Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish men, on the other hand, value joint household production 
less then Dutch men. Turkish households are the more traditional households, in the sense that 
the woman is more oriented on household production, while the man is oriented on paid labor. 
It is often believed that the bargaining power of women in more traditional households is 
relatively low, but our estimation results do not support this idea. In general, the wage 
elasticities of Dutch, Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean households are comparable. Men and 
women replace housework hours by paid labor if their hourly wage rate increases but do the 
opposite when the hourly wage rate of the partner increases. 
JEL Code: D12, D13, J22. 
Keywords: collective model, labor supply, child care. 
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Like all Western countries, the Netherlands has a sizeable minority of immigrants. Nowa-
days almost 10 percent of the Dutch population consists of non-Western (￿rst- or second-
generation) immigrants, and this number is expected to increase to over 20 percent in the
year 2050 (Netherlands Statistics, 2003). In spite of the fact that immigrant households are a
substantial and growing group within the total Dutch household population, they are usually
under-sampled or neglected in general surveys. Insofar as they participate in a survey, mem-
bers of those sub-populations are usually lumped together with the main population of Dutch
descent. As a consequence, research on household labor supply decisions in the Netherlands
tends to neglect the household labor supply decision process of these immigrants.
In this chapter we examine the time allocation decisions of Dutch, Turkish and Suri-
namese/Antillean households. By assuming endogenous labor supply for men and women
and by considering housework and household production, we aim to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the household decision process for the household types we distinguish.
Moreover, by making use of the collective household model, we are able to examine individ-
ual preferences and the intra-household bargaining process between the household members,
so that di￿erences in ethnic background may reveal interesting di￿erences between Dutch
and immigrant households.
The four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands are from Turkey, Morocco, Suri-
nam and the Dutch Antilles. During the 1950s, the Dutch decolonization process attracted
immigrants from Indonesia. In the 1960s, inhabitants of Surinam and the Antilles received
Dutch nationality, which gave them the right to work and live in the Netherlands (Cornelisse-
Vermaat, 2005). In the 1960s and 1970s, when the Dutch economy ￿ourished, Surinamese,
Antillean, and Turkish workers came to the Netherlands to ￿nd (low income) jobs. These im-
migrants were mostly men and although their initial intention was to stay in the Netherlands
temporarily, they usually stayed permanently. Because we consider Surinamese/Antillean
and Turkish households in this study, we shortly characterize these households.
The ￿rst group originates from the former Dutch colonies of Surinam and the Dutch
Antilles. Surinamese/Antillean households are well integrated in the Dutch society, their
mother tongue is frequently Dutch and they received an education which resembles that
of the Dutch. Some of them have been in the Netherlands for thirty years or more, while
others immigrated rather recently, in the last decade. The Turkish minority is one of the
largest minorities in the Netherlands. Most of them came from relatively backward regions
in Turkey; they are Muslim, and frequently speak only Turkish within the family. Many
2Dutch Turks have double nationality, and a large part of them choose marriage partners
from their homeland, who immigrate under the Law of Family Reunion. Their education
level is relatively low compared with the Dutch. The integration problems for both groups
are re￿ected by the high percentage of unemployed immigrants relative to the native Dutch
(CBS, 2003; SCP, 2002), the lower education levels of immigrants ( SCP, 2003), and,
according to the (Dutch) Scienti￿c Council for Government Policy ( WRR), the lack of
cohesion between immigrant groups and the native Dutch (WRR, 2001.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical framework. In
Section 3 we present the parametric speci￿cation of the model and the estimation method.
In Section 4 we discuss the data and the estimation results are discussed in Section 5. In
order to see how wage changes a￿ect the time allocation choices of households, we derive the
wage elasticities in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The approach in this chapter is similar
to that in Van Klaveren, van Praag, and Maassen van den Brink [2008].
2 Theory
We consider a two-earner household where the preferences of spouse i (i = m;f) are repre-
sented by the following direct utility function:
Ui(C;H;lei;whi;jhi); (1)
where Ui() is twice continuously di￿erentiable and strictly concave. The individual utility
functions depend on the household consumption, C, and the household production, H, and
on the time that is spent on leisure (lei), housework (whi) and paid work (jhi). It is usu-
ally assumed that the working e￿ort in￿uences utility negatively through a corresponding
loss of leisure hours. However, many studies on life satisfaction ￿nd that the experience
of unemployment itself, rather than the loss of income through unemployment, reduces life
satisfaction (Booth and van Ours, 2007). A similar argument can be made for housework ac-
tivities, and so men and women may derive positive or negative utility from the performance
of housework.
Household expenditures on consumption goods are not observed in the data and, there-
fore, household consumption, C, is considered to be one Hicksian composite good, whose
price is set to unity. The money value of this composite good is set equal to the total
3household income, Y . We have:
C = Y = wmjhm + wfjhf + y; (2)
where wmand wf represent the wage rates of the spouses, and y stands for the net non-labor
income of the household. Household production is generally not observed in data sets either.
We represent it by the household technology h(whm;whf), that is a function of the hours
that both spouses spend on housework, and we assume the following functional form:
H = h(whm;whf) = whm + whf; (3)
where  represents the marginal productivity of the woman relative to that of the man.
With household production we mean the  weighted sum of hours spent by both partners on
what they call ‘household tasks’. These tasks include cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry,
and other such activities. Of course, the distinction between housework and leisure may be
ambiguous, and therefore we leave the empirical de￿nition to the respondents themselves in
the empirical analysis.
Because the aggregated level of household income (that represents consumption) and the
weighted sum of the individual hours spent on housework each represent one value for each
household, it follows that household consumption and household production are treated as if
they are public goods in the household. However, this does not imply that commodities that
are bought out of the household income cannot be consumed by one of the two spouses, e.g.
clothing, the barber, etc., but it does imply that, even then, a purchase by one of them needs
the explicit or implicit approval of the other partner. It is an issue of bargaining between the
two partners who in the end gets most of the pie. An immediate consequence of the public
good assumption is, however, that it is not possible to examine how the various goods are
distributed over the household members.
In the collective model, household decisions are assumed to be Pareto-e￿cient and under
this assumption spouses behave as if an optimal bundle (lem;whm;lef;whf) is chosen that
maximizes the following household utility function: 1
Uh = (wm;wf;d)  Um(Y;H;lem;whm;T   lem   whm)
+ (1   (wm;wf;d))  Uf(Y;H;lef;whf;T   lef   whf);
(4)
1For a discussion of the collective model of household behavior we refer to studies by Vermeulen [2002],
Browning et al. [2006] and Donni [2007].
4subject to
(1) Y = wm  (T   lem   whm) + wf  (T   lef   whf) + y
(2) H = whm + whf
(3) 0 < lef;lem;whf;whm  1;
where T is the total time endowment per week, and where job hours of spouse i is replaced
by the individual time constraint T   lei   whi. For identi￿cation purposes, each spouse’s
leisure is assumed to be a private good, i.e. the husband does not bene￿t from the wife’s
leisure, and conversely (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2006).
The individual utility functions are weighted by the utility weight function () and this
function usually depends on wages, non-labor income and on variables that do not enter the
individual preferences directly but in￿uence the utility weight distribution. Hereafter, we
refer to the latter as distribution factors, d. An intuitive interpretation of the utility weight is
that it represents the division of bargaining power between the spouses. The higher the value
of (), the more the utility function of household member m is weighted in the household
utility function. An increase in () can, therefore, be interpreted as an improvement of the
bargaining position of the male.
It is important that () depends on the individual wage rates, because otherwise the
marginal compensated wage changes of the spouses would have the same e￿ect on each other’s
labor supply by de￿nition (this is usually referred to as the Slutsky symmetry condition). The
model would then collapse into a neo-classical unitary model, where individual preferences
are not considered and where the intra-household allocation of welfare cannot be studied. For
an elaborate discussion on the consequences when () is misspeci￿ed we refer to Browning
et al. [2006]. We note that the restrictions of the unitary model are often empirically tested
and almost always rejected in the empirical literature (see, among others, Ashworth and
Ulph, 1981; Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1986; Thomas, 1990; Browning and Costas, 1991;
Browning et al., 1994; Kawaguchi, 1994; Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Lundberg et al., 1997;
Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Ward-Batts, 2002).
The corresponding system of partial derivatives with respect to the man’s and woman’s
5leisure and housework are:
@Uh
@lem
=  
@Um
@lem
+ (1   ) 
@Uf
@lem
@Uh
@whm
=  
@Um
@whm
+ (1   ) 
@Uf
@whm
@Uh
@lef
=  
@Um
@lef
+ (1   ) 
@Uf
@lef
@Uh
@whf
=  
@Um
@whf
+ (1   ) 
@Uf
@whf
:
(5)
Let us focus on the ￿rst partial derivative with respect to male leisure that consists of two
terms. The ￿rst term represents the male part of the collective utility function, while the
second term represents the female part of the collective utility function. The leisure choice
of the man in￿uences the household utility through the utility of the man and the utility of
the woman. In order to see how this happens, we can write the ￿rst FOC more extensively
as:
@Uh
@lem
= (
@Um
@lem
+
@Um
@Y
@Y
@lem
+
@Um
@jhm
@jhm
@lem
) + (1   )(
@Uf
@Y
@Y
@lem
) (6)
The ￿rst term between parenthesis on the right hand side ( @Um
@lem) indicates that the man’s
leisure in￿uences the household utility directly through the utility function of the male. This
is the consequence of the identifying assumption that individual leisure is a private good.
Male leisure in￿uences the household utility through consumption Y and through the man’s
job hours, because we have replaced job hours by the individual time constraints. Because
household consumption is considered as a public good, the household utility is in￿uenced,
through the utility function of both the man and the woman, by the leisure time of the man.
As both utility functions are di￿erently weighted in the household utility function, the sum
of the individual partial e￿ects are weighted by the utility weight  as well.
We do not repeat this exercise for the other partial derivatives, because the intuition is
the same. Assuming that households are in equilibrium, i.e., assuming that the household
utility derivatives are equal to zero, and solving the partial derivatives for the choice variables
leisure and housework (and consequently job hours) gives the following system of demand
functions:
z = g(wm;wf;y;d); (7)
where we introduce the shorthand notation z that stands for the solution vector z =
6(lem;whm;lef;whf). These ‘time’ demand functions are functions of the wage rates, the
unearned income and the distribution factors that appear in the utility weight.
3 Parametric Speci￿cation and Estimation Method
3.1 Parametric Speci￿cation
According to the collective approach, household n’s behavior may be viewed as the outcome
of maximizing a household utility function of the following type:
Un;h = nUn;m + (1   n)Un;f (8)
subject to
Y = wm  (T   lem   whm) + wf  (T   lef   whf) + y
H = whm +   whf
0 < lef;lem;whf;whm  1;
where we assume for the moment that  is a constant variable. The preferences of household
member i are described by a log-additive utility function:
Ui = i;1 ln(lei) + i;2 ln(whi) + i;3 ln(H)
+ i;4 ln(fs + 1)  ln(H) + i;5 ln(Y ) + i;6 ln(jhi):
(9)
Because 20 hours of housework may in￿uence utility di￿erently for a two-person family than
it does for a family with two children, we assume that the e￿ect that H has on utility varies
with family size (fs), and include an interaction term between H and family size. Assuming
that men and women choose an optimal time allocation bundle, we have the following partial
derivatives:
7@Uh
@lem
=
@Uf
@lem
+ 

@Um
@lem
 
@Uf
@lem

@Uh
@whm
=
@Uf
@whm
+ 

@Um
@whm
 
@Uf
@whm

@Uh
@lef
=
@Uf
@lef
+ 

@Um
@lef
 
@Uf
@lef

@Uh
@whf
=
@Uf
@whf
+ 

@Um
@whf
 
@Uf
@whf

When we focus on the ￿rst two partial derivatives, it holds that the ￿rst and the third
term in each partial derivative refer to the partner’s part of the collective utility function.
This part exists because the individual utility of both partners is in￿uenced through H by
the partner’s hours on housework and through Y by the partner’s job hours. Given the
chosen parametric speci￿cation the derivative
@Uh
@lem becomes:
@Uh
@lem
=   [
m;1
lem
 
m;5  wm
Y
 
m;6
jhm
]   (1   )  [
f;5  wm
Y
]:
This derivative is a linear expression in the utility parameters (m;f) =  of the man and
the woman. The corresponding coe￿cients are non-linear expressions in lem, lef, whm, whf,
wm, wf, fs and y. The ￿rst coe￿cient, denoted by x1;m;1is , for example, 1
lem. Because m;2
does not appear in the ￿rst partial derivative we have x1;m;2 = 0. We may write the ￿rst
partial derivative as:
x
0
1ff + 
 
x
0
1mm   x
0
1ff

: (10)
The index 1 refers to the x vector in the ￿rst partial derivative. This x-vector is a 6-vector
function x1;m(lem;lef;whm;whf;wm;wf;fs;y). The other partial derivatives with respect to
whm;lef and whf can be obtained in a similar manner and the system of partial derivatives
can be written as
2
6 6
6 6
4
  x0
1m (1   )  x0
1f
  x0
2m (1   )  x0
2f
  x0
3m (1   )  x0
3f
  x0
4m (1   )  x0
4f
3
7 7
7 7
5
 =

  X
0
m (1   )  X
0
f

; (11)
where X0
m and X0
f are (4  6) matrices; and  stands for a 12-vector of utility parameters.
8For household n we de￿ne the (4  12)-matrix X0
n;h =

nX0
n;m (1   n)X0
n;f

so that the
expression in (11) can be written as:
X
0
n;h (12)
Throughout this chapter we will use the short-hand notation z =(lem,whm,lef,whf). The
system in (11) and (12) is the gradient of the household utility function Uh(z) and we shall
write it sometimes as the 4-vector U0
h(z) or, alternatively, as Uz. This system describes the
equilibrium if the gradient vector equals the zero vector. The ( 44)-matrix of second-order
derivatives of U00
h(z) is denoted by U00
h or Uzz.
Up until now, in this section, we have assumed that  is a constant variable. However, as
is mentioned by Browning et al. [2006], the collective model collapses into a standard unitary
model if the utility weight does not depend on prices, or, in our model, wages. Moreover,
the individual bargaining positions are likely to be a￿ected by other factors as well, such as
the number of children, the ages of the two partners and the net weekly non-labor income. 2
More formally, we assume that n depends on characteristics v and de￿ne it as:
n(v) = N(1 ln(wn;m) + 2 ln(wn;f) +
J X
j=3
j  vj;n); (13)
where N() stands for the standard normal distribution function. This functional speci￿-
cation is convenient because the arguments can take any value on the real axis, while  is
automatically constrained in [0,1]. We note that the normal distribution function is used
without any probabilistic connotation. For convenience we have listed the wage characteris-
tics in equation (13) separately from the other characteristics that may in￿uence the utility
weight (represented by
PJ
j=3 j  vj;n). Consider the case where 3 = ::: = J = 0, 1 =  2
and wm = wf. We then ￿nd that (v) = 1
2 and this represents an equal division of bargaining
power between men and women. In other words, the utility functions of men and women are
equally weighted in the household utility function. The weight (v) increases in the man’s
wage and decreases in the woman’s wage. If 3 = ::: = J = 0 and 1 6= 2, the weight is
asymmetric, that is, even if wm = wf, we may have (v) 6= 1
2.
Adding a constant, say 0, to the argument in N() would allow for the fact that one of
the individual utility functions is structurally overweighted. However, when we included 0
in the empirical model, it was always estimated as being insigni￿cant and hence we dropped
2We note that the fertility decision, and hence the presence of children, likely a￿ects the time that is spent
on labor, leisure and housework, simultanously, through preferences and bargaining. However, modelling this
decision of having children is beyond the scope of this study.
9it from the model.
3.2 Estimation Method
From the partial derivatives in (12) it follows that household n is in equilibrium if :
X
0
n = 0; (14)
where Xn is a linear function in n and , and where the parameter vector (;) has to be
estimated.3 Normally, we would solve this system for the choice variables lem whm, lef and
whf for each n, so that we obtain the optimal solution vector z = (le
m;wh
m;le
f;wh
f). By
comparing z
n with the observed zn we can ￿nd the optimal parameter estimates that would
minimize the di￿erence between z
n and zn. However, this solution vector z is highly non-
linear in the  and  parameters and so it is di￿cult to estimate the unknown parameters
by a direct estimation method. We propose a more convenient indirect estimation method
to estimate the unknown parameter vector (;) that is similar to the Wald-test criterion
approach (see also Wales and Woodland, 1983, Blundell and Robin, 1999, Van Klaveren et al.,
2008). The estimation method is inspired by the fact that (14) is linear in the parameter
vector .
Because the matrix equality in (14) does not hold exactly, we add a stochastic component
such that the estimation model becomes:
yn = X
0
n + "n; (15)
where yn is a nuisance vector with yn = 0 for all n, and where " is a 4-dimensional error
vector, which we assume to be "  N(0;"). It is likely that time allocation choices of
spouses are not correlated between households and so E("n;"n0) = 0 if n 6= n0. We do,
however, allow the " terms to be correlated within households, because such a correlation is
probable.
The system in equation (15) can be estimated by an iterative two-step procedure. In
the ￿rst step we set 
(1)
1 = ::: = 
(1)
J = 1, yielding the ￿rst round utility weight coe￿cients

(1)
n . The superscript indicates the iteration round and we note that 
(1)
n varies with the
household characteristics. Conditional on 
(1)
n , we can estimate the -parameters by the
method of Seemingly Unrelated Least Squares (SUR). Estimation of this system under
the constraints
P
m = 1 and
P
f = 1 is equivalent to minimizing
PN
1 0Xn 1
" X0
n with
3For notational convenience we write n instead of n(;vn) and leave out the subscript h.
10respect to  under those constraints. By assuming, without loss of generality that
P
m = 1
and
P
f = 1, we exclude the ‘trivial’ solution where all parameter estimates are 0. Because
the utility functions can be interpreted as a net of indi￿erence curves, the analysis is not
a￿ected by this normalization procedure.
In the second step we use the estimated -parameters in the ￿rst iteration round, denoted
by (1), and estimate 1;:::;J by means of a non-linear maximum likelihood procedure. The
estimated -parameters in the second step are denoted by (2) and we use them in the
second iteration round to calculate 
(2)
n . Conditional on 
(2)
n , we re-estimate (2) and with
the estimated (2)-parameters we re-estimate (3). These ’s are then used in the third
iteration round. We continue this iterative process until convergence is reached.
4 Data
The data were collected between September and November in 2001 by DESAN, a Dutch
organization for market research. The aim was to create a balanced sample with as many
Dutch households as Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean households. The Dutch sub-sample
is randomly drawn from the total pool of phone numbers of the Royal Dutch Mail ( KPN).
The immigrant sub-sample is drawn from a register owned by DESAN 4. In Table 1, we show
the number of two-earner households di￿erentiated according to ethnic background.
The ethnicity of the spouses is de￿ned as follows. For the respondent, we use the im-
migrant de￿nition of the Netherlands Statistics, i.e. the respondent is considered to be
an immigrant if at least one of the parents is born abroad (Netherlands Statistics, 2000).
However, for the respondent’s partner we cannot use this de￿nition because there is no in-
formation about the parental ethnicity of the partner. For the partner we, therefore, use a
question that directly asks for the partner’s ethnicity. The household is classi￿ed as Dutch,
Surinamese/Antillean, or Turkish, if both the respondent and the partner have the same
ethnicity.
In order to estimate the model, we need information on paid labor, leisure, and housework.
Although this information is available for the respondent, there is no information available
on housework for the partner. The hours spent on housework by the partner are therefore
imputed, conditional on individual and household characteristics. We denote the amount of
housework of the respondent as whr, and that of the partner as whp. The time endowment
4Strictly speaking we cannot label households from the second generation as immigrant households. How-
ever, for convenience, we will refer to Turkish, Surinamese/Antillean households as immigrant households.
11Table 1: Households by Ethnicity
Ethnicity Frequency Percentage
Dutch 153 42￿.86
Surinamese/Antillean 113 31.65
Turkish 91 25.49
Total 357 100.00
per week is 168 hours, and so we should have whp2[0,168]. Therefore, we de￿ne the auxiliary
variable  for the respondents of the N available households as:
n;r = log(
whn;r
168   whn;r
): (16)
The inverse of (16) equals whr = 168
1+e n;r and it is easy to check that whn;r2[0,168] for any
real number of n;r.5 Using the auxiliary variable, we estimate the following equation by
means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
n;r = 0 + 1  s
h
n;1 + ::: + k  s
h
n;k + k+1  s
r
n;k + ::: + K  s
r
n;K +  (17)
where sh
n are household characteristics; and sr
n are individual characteristics of the respon-
dents for the N available households. The explanatory variables that we use are gender, the
hourly wage rate, age, education level, the number of children between certain age levels,
having a computer at home and the ethnicity of the household, using Dutch households as
the reference group. The education variable represents the highest education level that is
attained and it is measured on an eight-point scale, where one stands for primary school
as highest education level and eight stands for having a university degree. The estimation
results are shown in Table 2.
From equation (16) it follows that a negative correlation between, for example, the male
dummy and  can be interpreted as a negative correlation between the male dummy and
the hours spent on housework. As was to be expected, men spend less time on housework
than women, and the presence of children increases the time that respondents devote to
housework. The estimation results suggest that ethnicity is not correlated with the time
devoted to housework, however the e￿ect of household ethnicity is captured by the child
variables.
By estimating equation (17) and obtaining ^ 0, ..., ^ K, we can impute the missing values
5If  = 0, then whr = 84; if  ! 1 then whr ! 168; and if  ! -1, then whr ! 0
12Table 2: Housework estimates for the respondents
Characteristics Estimate t-value
Male -0.504 -4.90
Hourly wage rate 0.003 0.40
Age 0.004 0.55
Highest education level -0.030 -1.11
Log(#-children 0/3+1) 1.126  7.31
Log(#-children 4/11+1) 0.583  5.03
Log(#-children 12/15+1) 0.573  3.86
Log(#-children 16/25+1) 0.393  2.54
Surinamese/Antillean -0.026 -0.22
Turkish 0.166 1.25
Computer at home 0.134 1.82
constant -3.251 -9.45
N 357
Adjusted R2 0.274
Note: */**/*** statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
^ whn;p by calculating ^ n;p:
b n;p = ^ 0 + ^ 1  s
h
n;1 + ::: + ^ j  s
h
n;k + ^ k+1  s
p
n;k + ::: + ^ n  s
p
n;K: (18)
In equation (18) the respondent’s characteristics are replaced by the characteristics of the
partner whose housework hours whp are not observed. Using ^ n;p and equation (16) we can
obtain values for ^ whn;p by inverting (16) as
whn;p =
168
1 + e ^ n;p
(19)
Table 3 displays the summary statistics, after imputation, for the di￿erent household types
that we distinguish. The hours spent on paid work, housework and leisure are hours per
week.
The values associated with Surinamese/Antillean households are always in between those
of Dutch and Turkish households. This is not so surprising, because Surinamese and An-
tillean households are more similar to Dutch households than Turkish households. The
descriptives statistics are in line with those usually found for the Netherlands (see Nether-
lands Statistics, 2003). When we compare the men of the di￿erent household types with
their partners we ￿nd that they are older, spend more hours on paid work, spend less hours
13Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Dutch Sur./Ant. Turkish
Male
Time spent on paid work 39.97 37.58 39.37
Time spent on housework 8.24 11.33 14.74
Time spent on leisure 119.79 119.10 113.89
Education level 5.45 5.33 4.55
Age level 39.35 41.41 36.04
Hourly wage rate 10.00 9.65 8.19
Female
Time spent on paid work 25.84 29.27 26.56
Time spent on housework 16.69 17.89 23.59
Time spent on leisure 125.48 120.84 117.85
Education level 5.22 4.81 3.67
Age level 37.33 38.07 32.76
Hourly wage rate 9.16 8.82 8.00
Household
#-children 0/3 0.29 0.27 0.27
#-children 4/11 0.44 0.58 0.88
#-children 12/15 0.23 0.38 0.35
#-children 16/25 0.16 0.42 0.32
#-children 25 plus 0.01 0.03 0.01
Family size 3.13 3.68 3.84
Household income per week 637.83 615.44 522.46
N 153 113 91
14on housework and earn a higher hourly wage. Furthermore, we ￿nd that Dutch (wo)men
earn more per hour than immigrant (wo)men. The average family size is largest for Turkish
households, followed by Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch households.
According to Netherlands Statistics, Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish men and women
are lower educated than Dutch men and women (Netherlands Statistics, 2003). This is also
the case in our sample, except for Surinamese/Antillean men, who are about equally well
educated than Dutch men. This means that well educated Surinamese/Antillean men are
overrepresented in our sample.
5 Estimation Results
We focus ￿rst on the estimated preference parameters (m;f) for Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean
and Turkish households. The estimation results are displayed in Table 4. The table also
displays  that represents the marginal productivity of the woman relative to that of the
man, and the utility weight , that represents how the individual utility functions are, on
average, weighted in the household utility function.
Following the de￿nition of household tasks, it is not assumed that household hours of
male and female are perfect substitutes, i.e.  = 1. If  > 1, this means that the woman
is marginally more productive in the household and if  < 1 this means that the man is
marginally more productive in the household. To asses , we let it vary with a width of 0:025,
and choose the  estimate that yields the highest log likelihood of the linear parameters.
The relative marginal productivity is 0:98 for Dutch households, 0:8 for Turkish house-
holds, and 1:35 for Surinamese/Antillean. This means that the marginal housework hour of
the Surinamese/Antillean woman is more valuable than that of her partner. The marginal
housework hour of Dutch men is about equally productive than the marginal housework hour
of Dutch women. The marginal housework hour of Turkish men is more productive than
that of the Turkish women. Although  may re￿ect the ratio of productivity, it may also
re￿ect cultural backgrounds where di￿erent norms and values apply. It is well known that
the roles of male co-workers in the household are very di￿erently interpreted in the three
ethnic communities considered. Hence, we should be careful when making a productivity
statement based on the value of the  parameter. The model is, nevertheless, more ￿exible
by allowing for a rate of substitution that may be di￿erent from 1.
For Dutch men, the most important variables in their utility function are leisure and
household income. For Dutch women, leisure seems to be the most important variable and
15Table 4: Estimated preference parameters
Dutch Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Leisure 0.752 66.00 0.759 50.55
Housework 0.005 4.19 -0.003 -2.35
Household production (H) -0.010 -0.59 0.066 3.15
H ￿ interaction term -0.001 -0.04 0.084 2.86
Household income 0.223 10.61 0.095 4.63
Job hours 0.031 3.44 -0.001 -0.15
Surinamese/Antillean Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Leisure 0.841 62.72 0.681 63.47
Housework 0.006 5.97 -0.014 -10.13
Household production (H) -0.053 -0.56 0.133 1.37
H ￿ interaction term -0.140 -1.55 0.167 1.84
Household income 0.299 8.61 0.009 0.28
Job hours 0.048 3.85 0.024 3.50
Turkish Male Female
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Leisure 0.924 64.82 0.499 34.08
Housework 0.019 8.12 -0.009 -6.40
Household production (H) -0.095 -1.78 0.205 3.11
H ￿ interaction term -0.107 -1.90 0.180 2.57
Household income 0.115 4.36 0.133 5.64
Job hours 0.144 13.69 -0.009 -3.79
Dutch Surinamese/Antillean Turkish
 0.55 0.47 0.52
 0.98 1.35 0.80
N 153 113 91
16household income less so. Dutch women do not derive utility from individual household
chores, but they do ￿nd joint household production important. So household tasks have
to be done, but preferably not by themselves but by the partner. The importance of joint
household production increases the larger the size of the family.
Leisure and household income are the most important variables in the utility function of
Surinamese/Antillean Men. For these men, also joint household production interacted with
family size is important, although this variable enters the utility function negatively. The
estimation results for Dutch and Surinamese/Antillean men are rather similar, which is not
that surprising, given the similarities in background characteristics (see Table 3).
Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch women appear to have di￿erent preferences, although
leisure is important for both groups. While joint household production and household pro-
duction interacted with family size signi￿cantly enter the utility function of both Dutch and
Surinamese/Antillean women, these variables are much more important for the latter group.
Turkish families appear to be di￿erent from Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch households.
The most important variable for Turkish men is leisure. Other, but less important variables,
are household income and job hours. Household production and household production inter-
acted with family size appear negatively in the utility function of Turkish men. For Turkish
women, on the other hand, household production and household production interacted with
family size is very important, just as leisure is important to these women. While leisure
is important, the coe￿cient of leisure is much smaller than the leisure coe￿cient of Suri-
namese/Antillean and Dutch women. An explanation for the preference di￿erences between
Turkish households and the other households that we distinguish is that these households
are in general more traditional: men specialize on the labor market, and women specialize
in household work.
In Table 4, we report the average utility weight, . When  is higher than 0.5, this
means that the utility function of the male is more heavily weighted in the collective utility
function. For Dutch households,  is slightly higher than 0.5, as is also the case for Turkish
households. The latter result is interesting, because a more traditional household is usually
associated with a situation where the bargaining position of the woman is relatively low.
However, our results indicate that Turkish households are the more traditional households,
but we do not ￿nd evidence that the bargaining position of women is relatively low. For
Surinamese/Antillean households, we ￿nd that the value is slightly below 0:5. This means
that the relative bargaining position of the two spouses in Surinamese/Antillean households
di￿ers from that in Dutch and Turkish households. An explanation for this result may be
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Figure 1: Distribution graphs of utility weight function
that the divorce rate in Surinamese/Antillean families is relatively high, so that it is more
important to maintain a higher degree of independence.
The distributions of n for the three household types are shown in Figure 1. The upper left
graph shows the distribution of n for Dutch households and we ￿nd that it is approximately
normally distributed around the mean of 0.55. For Surinamese/Antillean households (upper
right graph) we ￿nd that the power distribution is skewed to the left and so the median
value of n is smaller than the average value of n. A t-test shows that  is signi￿cantly
smaller than 0.5 for Surinamese/Antillean households and this means that the utility weight
that is assigned to the woman’s utility function is frequently higher than the weight that
is assigned to the man’s utility function. For Turkish households (lower left graph) we ￿nd
very di￿erent values for n, and that most values are above 0:5. A t-test indicates that 
is signi￿cantly higher than 0:5, which means that the utility function of Turkish men gets,
on average, more weight in the collective household utility function. More generally, Figure
1 shows that there is substantial variation in the distribution of the utility weight between
individual households.
Table 5 shows the estimation results concerning the utility weight, where the utility
weight depends on wage rates, the number of children between certain age levels and age. 6
For Dutch households we ￿nd that age, the hourly wage rate, and the number of children
aged between zero and three in￿uences the utility weight distribution. When partners are
about the same age, the age e￿ect will be small. However, if the age di￿erence increases,
6Because the education levels of men and women and the unearned income were not signi￿cant, we
dropped these variables from the model.
18Table 5: Estimated utility weight functions
Dutch Sur./Ant.
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Log(wmale) 0.174 3.20 0.011 0.40
Log(wfemale) -0.190 -3.96 0.029 0.94
Log(#-children 0/3+1) -0.185  -3.87 -0.222 -6.91
Log(#-children 4/11+1) 0.033 0.89 -0.089  -4.43
Log(#-children 12/15+1) 0.001 0.02 -0.043  -2.04
Log(#-children >16+1) -0.073 -1.22 0.030 1.36
Log(agemale) 0.445 2.92 0.050 0.57
Log(agefemale) -0.402 -2.62 -0.082 -0.89
N 153 113
Turkish
Estimate t-value
Log(wmale) 0.144 4.20
Log(wfemale) -0.100 -3.88
Log(#-children 0/3+1) -0.360  -8.38
Log(#-children 4/11+1) -0.007 -0.27
Log(#-children 12/16+1) -0.064  -2.06
Log(#-children >16+1) -0.099 -2.95
Log(agemale) -0.032 -0.42
Log(agefemale) 0.041 0.55
N 91
Note: */**/*** statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
the utility weight distribution shifts to the advantage of the older partner, mostly men. The
bargaining power of the woman increases when there are children present in the household
aged between 0 and 3. The wage rate e￿ects are as expected: the power distribution will
shift in the direction of the partner whose hourly wage rate increases.
For Surinamese/Antillean households, the variation in the power distribution is entirely
driven by the presence of children in the household. This is an interesting result. Apparently,
the time allocation choices are not in￿uenced by the individual wage rates and so a wage
increase in￿uences the time allocation choices of the partner only through the e￿ect of the
household income in the utility function and not through bargaining. Surinamese/Antillean
women have more bargaining power if there are (more) children in the household and the
bargaining e￿ect is more pronounced when the children are younger. Similar to Dutch
households, we ￿nd a wage e￿ect for Turkish households, although this e￿ect is not as strong.
Also for Turkish households we ￿nd that the presence of children increase the bargaining
19power of the woman and that this e￿ect is more pronounced when the children are between
zero and three years old.
6 Wage E￿ects
Time allocation choices depend on the wage rates of both partners, so it is interesting to
examine how time allocation choices react to marginal wage changes. More formally, if the
wage vector (wm,wf) = w changes by w, we are interested in the change in z(w). Note
that we use the short-hand notation z =(lem,whm,lef,whf). The wage e￿ect matrix can be
written as:7
@z
@w =  (Uzz)
 1
2
4Um;zw + (1   )Uf;zw | {z }
+[Um;z   Uf;z]

@
@w
0
| {z }
3
5
A B
; (20)
and consists of two parts. Part A, represents the usual gross substitution e￿ect and part B
represents the bargaining e￿ect. From the identity jh + wh + le  24, it follows that the
wage e￿ects on job hours of the man and the woman are:
@jhm
@w
=  

@whm
@w
+
@lem
@w

and
@jhf
@w
=  

@whf
@w
+
@lef
@w

:
The corresponding elasticities, @z
@w:w
z , can be obtained using (20). The elasticities are evalu-
ated in the sample mean and are displayed in Table 6.
For all three household types we ￿nd a minor wage e￿ect on the time that is allocated
to leisure. It seems that men and women replace job hours for housework hours or vice
versa. Men and women replace housework hours by paid labor if their hourly wage rate
increases and that they do the opposite when the hourly wage rate of the partner increases.
The labor supply wage elasticities in this study are in line with those usually found for
the Netherlands, although they are more pronounced. Evers et al. [2005] performed a meta-
analysis and considered 239 wage elasticities from 32 empirical studies for di￿erent countries.
For the Netherlands, they found that the labor supply wage elasticities for men and women
7In Appendix A we show how this wage e￿ect matrix is constructed.
20Table 6: Wage Elasticities
Dutch Surinamese/ Turkish
Antillean
wm wf wm wf wm wf
lem -0.15 0.15 -0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.06
whm -4.41 4.11 -4.24 2.32 -1.46 1.26
jhm 1.16 -1.10 1.08 -0.85 0.53 -0.57
lef 0.17 -0.16 0.07 -0.14 0.23 -0.26
whf 2.63 -2.60 2.51 -1.24 0.38 -0.48
jhf -1.89 1.78 -1.88 1.54 -1.31 1.75
are, on average, 0.1 and 0.5, while we ￿nd 1.16 and 1.78. The wage elasticities used by Evers
et al. [2005] are estimated on the basis of individual labor supply data, where the interaction
between the household members and the time that is spent on housework are not considered,
and this may explain why the wage elasticities are more pronounced in this study.
In Table 3, we found that the values of the descriptive statistics associated with Suri-
namese/Antillean households were in between those of Dutch and Turkish households and
in Table 6 we ￿nd the same for the wage elasticities values, with the exception of the labor
supply wage elasticity of women. The wage elasticities for Surinamese/Antillean households
are not the result of bargaining between the household members, because the individual wage
rates were not signi￿cant in the utility weight function. It follows that the wage elasticities
for Surinamese/Antillean households purely represent the usual gross substitution e￿ect, i.e.
part A in equation (20). Based on our preference parameter and utility weight function esti-
mates, we conclude that wage elasticity di￿erences between Dutch and Surinamese/Antillean
households are the result of bargaining between Dutch men and women and are, at the same
time, the result of a preference di￿erence with respect to the joint household production.
This explains why the housework wage elasticity for Surinamese/Antillean women is smaller
than that for Dutch women.
Although the wage elasticities for Turkish households are comparable to those of Dutch
and Surinamese/Antillean households, they are less pronounced. This con￿rms the idea
that Turkish households are the more traditional households, since time allocation choices
are less responsive to wage changes. However, the labor supply wage elasticity for Turkish
women is higher than that for Surinamese/Antillean women and comparable to that of Dutch
women, and in that sense, Turkish households cannot be characterized as the more traditional
households. The housework wage elasticity of Turkish men is lower than that of Dutch and
Surinamese/Antillean men. An explanation for this result is that labor supply choices are to
21a large extent determined by gender roles. Turkish men, often, do not perform housework
activities, such as cleaning, ironing etc. Although Turkish households are, on average, more
traditional, the housework wage elasticity for men can be caused by the less traditional
Turkish households in the sample and this would also explain why the total housework wage
elasticity is less pronounced.
Unfortunately, cross-elasticities for the Netherlands are (almost) never reported in em-
pirical studies, and so it is not possible to relate our ￿ndings to those of other studies. That
men and women work more labor hours if their hourly wage increases, but work less labor
hours if the hourly wage rate of the partner increases, is an interesting result from a policy
perspective. Let us focus, for example, on the wage elasticities of Dutch households that are
remarkably symmetric.
The point of departure for current Dutch government policies is the idea that women
supply more hours of paid labor if there wage rate is increased. This result is in line with
the wage elasticities in Table 6. It is also in line with the observation that in young Dutch
two-earner households both partners frequently have less than a full-time job. Policy makers
often mention that increasing the labor supply of women is bene￿cial because it generates
extra bene￿ts through income taxes. However, usually they do not take into account the
cross-elasticities. Thereby, they neglect the possibility that men in two-earner households,
who generally pay higher marginal taxes than their partner, may supply less paid labor
when the partner supplies more paid labor. As a consequence, the total bene￿ts for the
government may be smaller than expected, or may even be negative. Government tax policy
should thus take these cross-e￿ects into account when they estimate the prospective tax
bene￿ts of increasing female labor participation.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we examined the time allocation decisions of Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean
and Turkish households. We assume that paid labor and housework are the endogenous
choice variables and furthermore consider household production. By using the theoretical
framework of the collective household model, we can examine individual preferences and the
intra-household bargaining process between the household members.
We ￿nd that leisure and household income are important utility variables for the house-
hold types we distinguish. Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish women di￿er from Dutch
women because they value (joint) household production much more in their utility function.
22Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish men, on the other hand, value joint household production
less then Dutch men. Turkish households are the more traditional households, in the sense
that the woman is more oriented on household production, while the man is oriented on paid
labor.
It is often believed that the bargaining power of women in more traditional households
is relatively low, but our estimation results do not support this idea. For Dutch and Turkish
households, we ￿nd that the man has slightly more bargaining power than his partner, and
that the bargaining power varies in a similar way with individual and household character-
istics. It increases with wage and the presence of young children increases the bargaining
power of women. We conclude that the distribution of bargaining power within Turkish
households is comparable with that of Dutch households, even though more traditional gen-
der roles apply in Turkish household. For Surinamese/Antillean households we ￿nd that the
distribution of bargaining power within the household is entirely driven by the presence of
children. The bargaining power of the woman increases when there are (more) children in the
household. It follows that time allocation choices of Surinamese/Antillean men and women
are only in￿uenced by the partner’s wage through the household income and not through
bargaining, because the individual bargaining position is not a￿ected by the individual wage
rates.
In general, the wage elasticities of Dutch, Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean households
are comparable, although those for Turkish households are less pronounced. Because the
wage elasticities with respect to leisure are close to zero, we ￿nd that men and women
replace housework hours by paid labor if their hourly wage rate increases and that they
do the opposite when the hourly wage rate of the partner increases. The labor supply
wage elasticities that we ￿nd are comparable with those usually found for the Netherlands,
although they are more pronounced.
The less pronounced wage elasticities of Turkish households may re￿ect that these are
the more traditional, however, at the same time we ￿nd that the labor supply wage elasticity
of Turkish women resembles that of Dutch women, and in that sense we cannot refer to the
Turkish households as being more traditional. The wage elasticity with respect to housework
for Surinamese/Antillean women is smaller than that for Dutch women. This di￿erence is
the result of bargaining within Dutch households, and, at the same time, is the result of a
preference di￿erence with respect to the joint household production.
Cross-elasticities are (almost) never reported and this is unfortunate because of its policy
relevance. Based on our estimation results, and ignoring cross-elasticities, it is bene￿cial to
23increase the labor supply of women, as long as the costs are lower than the extra bene￿ts that
are recieved through income taxes. However, taking into account the cross-wage elasticities,
we ￿nd that such an increase in the labor supply of women comes along with a decrease
in the labor supply of men, who generally pay higher marginal taxes than their partner.
Government tax policy should thus take these cross-e￿ects into account when they estimate
the prospective tax bene￿ts of increasing female labor participation.
Appendix A
In this appendix we show how the wage e￿ect matrix is constructed. Let us return to the
system in (11) and assume that w(0);z(0) represents the situation ex ante, and that w(1);z(1)
is the new equilibrium. The (4  12)-matrix X is a function of w and by di￿erentiating
the elements of the matrix X also with respect to w, we add two columns to the matrix
Uzz, producing the (46)-matrix (Uzz U0
zw). The matrix U0
zw is a (42)-matrix. Because
@Uh
@z =  @Um
@z + (1   )
@Uf
@z = 0, we have to take into account that  depends on the wage
vector as well:
Uzz =   Um;zz + (1   )  Uf;zz
Uzw =   Um;zw + (1   )Uf;zw + [Um;z   Uf;z]

@
@w
0
;
where the last element is the product of a (12)- matrix and a (41) matrix, resulting in
a (42)- matrix. Denoting z(1) z(0) = z, the new equilibrium has to satisfy the equation:
Uzzz + U
0
zww = 0:
The wage e￿ect matrix is therefore:
@z
@w
=  (Uzz)
 1

Um;zw + (1   )Uf;zw + [Um;z   Uf;z]

@
@w
0
24References
J. Ashworth and D. T. Ulph. Households Models. In: C.V. Brown (eds.). London: Allen and
Unwin, 1981.
R. Blundell and J.M. Robin. An iterated least squares estimator for conditionally linear
equations models. Journal of Applied Econometrics , 14(3):209￿232, 1999.
A. L. Booth and J. C. van Ours. Job satisfaction and family hapiness: The part-time work
puzzle. Center Discussion Paper, 2007.
M. Browning and P. A. Chiappori. E￿cient intra-household allocations: A general charac-
terization and empirical tests. Econometrica, pages 1241￿1278, 1998.
M. Browning and M. Costas. The e￿ects of male and female labor supply on commodity
demands. Econometrica, 59(4):925￿51, 1991.
M. Browning, F. Bourguignon, P. A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene. Children and household
economic behavior. The Journal of Political Economy , pages 1067￿1096, 1994.
M. Browning, P.A. Chiappori, and Valerie Lechene. Collective and unitary models: A
clari￿cation. Review of Economics of the Household , 4:5￿14, 2006.
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Standaardde￿nitie allochtonen [standard de￿nition of
immigrants]. 2000.
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Allochtonen in nederland 2003 [immigrants in the nether-
lands 2003]. 2003.
P. A. Chiappori and I. Ekeland. The micro economics of e￿cient group behavior: Identi￿-
cation. 2006.
J. R. Cornelisse-Vermaat. Household production, health and hapiness. A comparison of the
native Dutch and non-western immigrants in the Netherlands . PhD thesis, University of
Wageningen, 2005.
J. Dagevos. Perspectief of integratie. over de sociaal-culturele en structurele integratie van
etnische minderheden in nederland [perspective on integration. on socio-cultural and struc-
tural integration of ethnic minorities in the netherlands]. 2001.
25J. Dagevos, M. Gijsbert, and C. van Praag. Rapportage minderheden 2003. onderwijs, arbeid
en sociaal culturele integratie [report on ethnic minorities. education, market labor and
socio-cultural integration]. 2003.
O. Donni. Household behavior and family economics . contribution 6.154.9. 2007.
M. Evers, R. de Mooij, and D. van Vuuren. What explains the variation in estimates of
labour supply elasticities? CPB Discussion Paper, 2005.
B. Fortin and G. Lacroix. A test of the unitary and collective models of household labor
supply. Economic Journal, 107(443):933￿956, 1997.
A. Kawaguchi. Testing neoclassical and non-neoclassical models of household labour supply.
Applied Economics, 26(1):9￿19, 1994.
P. Kooreman and A. Kapteyn. Estimation of rationed and unrationed household labour
supply functions using ￿exible functional forms. Economic Journal, 96(382):398￿412, 1986.
S. Lundberg, R. Pollak, and T.J. Wales. Do husbands and wives pool their resources?
evidence from the u.k. child bene￿t. Journal of Human Resources, 32(3):463￿480, 1997.
W. Portegijs, A. Boelen, and S. Keuzekamp. Emancipatie monitor 2002 [emancipation
monitor 2002]. 2002.
D. Thomas. Intra household resource allocation: An inferential approach. Journal of Human
Resources, 25(4):635￿664, 1990.
C. Van Klaveren, B.M.S. van Praag, and H. Maassen van den Brink. A public good version
of the collective household model: an empirical approach with an application to British
household data. Review of Economics of the Household , (2):169￿191, 2008.
F. Vermeulen. Collective household models: principles and main results. Journal of Economic
Surveys, 16(4):534￿564, 2002.
T.J. Wales and A.D. Woodland. Estimation of consumer demand systems with binding
non-negativity constraints. Journal of Econometrics, 21(3):263￿285, 1983.
J. Ward-Batts. Out of the wallet and into the purse: Using micro data to test income
pooling. Claremont Colleges Working Paper in Economics, No. 2002-11, 2002.
26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2809 Johan Eyckmans and Cathrine Hagem, The European Union’s Potential for Strategic 
Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts, September 2009 
 
2810 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, The Cross-section of Firms over the Business 
Cycle: New Facts and a DSGE Exploration, October 2009 
 
2811 Slobodan Djajić and Michael S. Michael, Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of 
the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach, October 2009 
 
2812 Devis Geron, Social Security Incidence under Uncertainty Assessing Italian Reforms, 
October 2009 
 
2813 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Economic Nationalism and Economic 
Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century, October 
2009 
 
2814 Emilia Simeonova, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Impact of Natural Disasters on 
Pregnancy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2815 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and 
Policy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2816 Sascha O. Becker, Erik Hornung and Ludger Woessmann, Catch Me If You Can: 
Education and Catch-up in the Industrial Revolution, October 2009 
 
2817 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Imports, Pass-Through, and the Structure of Retail 
Markets, October 2009 
 
2818 Paul De Grauwe and Daniel Gros, A New Two-Pillar Strategy for the ECB, October 
2009 
 
2819 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Thouraya Hadj Amor and Christophe Rault, International 
Financial Integration and Real Exchange Rate Long-Run Dynamics in Emerging 
Countries: Some Panel Evidence, October 2009 
 
2820 Saša Žiković and Randall K. Filer, Hybrid Historical Simulation VaR and ES: 
Performance in Developed and Emerging Markets, October 2009 
 
2821 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, The Political Economy of Conscription, October 
2009 
 
2822 Steinar Holden and Åsa Rosén, Discrimination and Employment Protection, October 
2009 
 
  
2823 David G. Mayes, Banking Crisis Resolution Policy – Lessons from Recent Experience – 
Which elements are needed for robust and efficient crisis resolution?, October 2009 
 
2824 Christoph A. Schaltegger, Frank Somogyi and Jan-Egbert Sturm, Tax Competition and 
Income Sorting: Evidence from the Zurich Metropolitan Area, October 2009 
 
2825 Natasa Bilkic, Thomas Gries and Margarethe Pilichowski, Stay in School or Start 
Working? – The Human Capital Investment Decision under Uncertainty and 
Irreversibility, October 2009 
 
2826 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Worker-Specific Effects of Globalisation, 
October 2009 
 
2827 Alexander Fink and Thomas Stratmann, Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: 
The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints, October 2009 
 
2828 Wolfgang Ochel and Anja Rohwer, Reduction of Employment Protection in Europe: A 
Comparative Fuzzy-Set Analysis, October 2009 
 
2829 Rainald Borck and Martin Wimbersky, Political Economics of Higher Education 
Finance, October 2009 
 
2830 Torfinn Harding and Frederick van der Ploeg, Is Norway’s Bird-in-Hand Stabilization 
Fund Prudent Enough? Fiscal Reactions to Hydrocarbon Windfalls and Graying 
Populations, October 2009 
 
2831 Klaus Wälde, Production Technologies in Stochastic Continuous Time Models, October 
2009 
 
2832 Biswa Bhattacharyay, Dennis Dlugosch, Benedikt Kolb, Kajal Lahiri, Irshat 
Mukhametov and Gernot Nerb, Early Warning System for Economic and Financial 
Risks in Kazakhstan, October 2009 
 
2833 Jean-Claude Trichet, The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support, October 2009 
 
2834 Hans Gersbach, Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication, October 2009 
 
2835 Ansgar Belke, Gunther Schnabl and Holger Zemanek, Real Convergence, Capital 
Flows, and Competitiveness in Central and Eastern Europe, October 2009 
 
2836 Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, The Life Satisfaction Approach to 
Environmental Valuation, October 2009 
 
2837 Christoph Böhringer and Knut Einar Rosendahl, Green Serves the Dirtiest: On the 
Interaction between Black and Green Quotas, October 2009 
 
2838 Katarina Keller, Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, Does Military Draft Discourage 
Enrollment in Higher Education? Evidence from OECD Countries, October 2009 
 
  
2839 Giovanni Cespa and Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. 
Hayek, October 2009 
 
2840 Jan Boone and Jan C. van Ours, Why is there a Spike in the Job Finding Rate at Benefit 
Exhaustion?, October 2009 
 
2841 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel and Stephan L. Thomsen, Right-Wing Extremism and 
the Well-Being of Immigrants, October 2009 
 
2842 Andrea Weber and Christine Zulehner, Competition and Gender Prejudice: Are 
Discriminatory Employers Doomed to Fail?, November 2009 
 
2843 Hadi Salehi Esfahani, Kamiar Mohaddes and M. Hashem Pesaran, Oil Exports and the 
Iranian Economy, November 2009 
 
2844 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, Firm-Specific Productivity Risk over the 
Business Cycle: Facts and Aggregate Implications, November 2009 
 
2845 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Burcu Erdogan and Vladimir Kuzin, Testing for 
Convergence in Stock Markets: A Non-Linear Factor Approach, November 2009 
 
2846 Michèle Belot and Jan Fidrmuc, Anthropometry of Love – Height and Gender 
Asymmetries in Interethnic Marriages, November 2009 
 
2847 Volker Nitsch and Nikolaus Wolf, Tear Down this Wall: On the Persistence of Borders 
in Trade, November 2009 
 
2848 Jan K. Brueckner and Stef Proost, Carve-Outs Under Airline Antitrust Immunity, 
November 2009 
 
2849 Margarita Katsimi and Vassilis Sarantides, The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Profits, 
November 2009 
 
2850 Scott Alan Carson, The Relationship between Stature and Insolation: Evidence from 
Soldiers and Prisoners, November 2009 
 
2851 Horst Raff and Joachim Wagner, Intra-Industry Adjustment to Import Competition: 
Theory and Application to the German Clothing Industry, November 2009 
 
2852 Erkki Koskela, Impacts of Labor Taxation with Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive 
Labor Markets under Flexible Outsourcing, November 2009 
 
2853 Cletus C. Coughlin and Dennis Novy, Is the International Border Effect Larger than the 
Domestic Border Effect? Evidence from U.S. Trade, November 2009 
 
2854 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Source versus Residence Based Taxation with 
International Mergers and Acquisitions, November 2009 
 
2855 Andreas Hoffmann and Gunther Schnabl, A Vicious Cycle of Manias, Crashes and 
Asymmetric Policy Responses – An Overinvestment View, November 2009  
2856 Xavier Vives, Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information, 
November 2009 
 
2857 M. Hashem Pesaran and Paolo Zaffaroni, Optimality and Diversifiability of Mean 
Variance and Arbitrage Pricing Portfolios, November 2009 
 
2858 Davide Sala, Philipp J.H. Schröder and Erdal Yalcin, Market Access through Bound 
Tariffs, November 2009 
 
2859 Ben J. Heijdra and Pim Heijnen, Environmental Policy and the Macroeconomy under 
Shallow-Lake Dynamics, November 2009 
 
2860 Enrico Spolaore, National Borders, Conflict and Peace, November 2009 
 
2861 Nina Czernich, Oliver Falck, Tobias Kretschmer and Ludger Woessmann, Broadband 
Infrastructure and Economic Growth, December 2009 
 
2862 Evžen Kočenda and Martin Vojtek, Default Predictors and Credit Scoring Models for 
Retail Banking, December 2009 
 
2863 Christian Gollier and Martin L. Weitzman, How Should the Distant Future be 
Discounted when Discount Rates are Uncertain?, December 2009 
 
2864 Tiberiu Dragu and Mattias Polborn, Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability, 
December 2009 
 
2865 Torfinn Harding and Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, A Touch of Sophistication: FDI and 
Unit Values of Exports, December 2009 
 
2866 Matthias Dischinger and Nadine Riedel, There’s no Place like Home: The Profitability 
Gap between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries, December 2009 
 
2867 Andreas Haufler and Frank Stähler, Tax Competition in a Simple Model with 
Heterogeneous Firms: How Larger Markets Reduce Profit Taxes, December 2009 
 
2868 Steinar Holden, Do Choices Affect Preferences? Some Doubts and New Evidence, 
December 2009 
 
2869 Alberto Asquer, On the many Ways Europeanization Matters: The Implementation of 
the Water Reform in Italy (1994-2006), December 2009 
 
2870 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad and Jakob De Haan, Financial Reform and Banking Crises, 
December 2009 
 
2871 Annette Alstadsæter and Hans Henrik Sievertsen, The Consumption Value of Higher 
Education, December 2009 
 
2872 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 
Collective Labor Supply of Native Dutch and Immigrant Households in the 
Netherlands, December 2009 